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GERMANY AND AMERICAN OPINION.
PROFESSOR ALBION SMALL TO PROFESSOR GEORG SIMMEL.
For the follbwing cbmmunication, addressed by a represen-
tative American sociologist to a German sbciblogist no less
representative, we are indebted to Professor Charles A. Ellwood,
of the University of Missouri, who writes: It may be of
interest to the members of the Sociological Society to know
the trend of academic opinion in the United States, and
especially of American sociologists, regarding the present war. I
have tried to keep in close touch with this matter, and I think it
safe to say that nine out of ten American academic men in respon-
sible positions are non-sympathetic with Germany in this war, in
spite of the systematic campaign which German professors have
undertaken to influence the opinions of their American colleagues,
and in spite of the traditional influence of German over American
universities. The enclosed copy of a letter from Professor Albion
W. Small, of the University of Chicago, to Professor Georg
Simmel, of the University of Strassburg, well illustrates the attitude
of those Americans who have been most friendly to German
scholarship. As your readers know. Dr. Small is editor of the
American Journal of Sociology, is a leader of sociological thought
in America, and was for two years president of the American
Sociological Society. He has always been a protagonist of German
scholarship in the social sciences, and is closely related by family
ties to the German people. His letter was written in reply to one
of Dr. Simmel's claiming that " all the world is believing lies about
Germany."
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
October 29, 1914.
Professor Dr. Georg Simmel, Strassburg.
My dear colleague and friend,—•
A message from you is always welcome, but I share most
genuinely with you the pain of the occasion which gives rise to any
conferring at all upon the subject which is uppermost in my mind,
as it is in yours. Indeed, I have postponed my reply from day to
day because I felt unequal to the delicate problem of conveying on
paper precisely my own reaction, which so far as I can discover is
substantially that of nine out of every ten academic men in the
United States. There are certain things which must be empha-
sized : first of all, that in a mere measuring of sympathy with the
various pebples bf Europe, apart from any judgment upon specific
issues in controversy between them, American academic sentiment
for the past thirty years, and to-day as emphatically as ever, is
overwhelmingly in favour of the Germans. We do not express
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ourselves in the German way. We do not pronounce German
civilization as a whole superior to bther civilizatibns. We think
that is repeating in varied form our own naive blunder in the
formative days of our nation, viz., for nearly a hundred years it
was the almost unchallenged American formula that our Constitu-
tion is not only the best pbssible for burselves at the given moment,
but that it is the only government fit for progressive human beings
anywhere. We have changed our minds about that. So we try
to restrain ourselves from violations of courtesy when we encounter,
face to face, German expressions of the German estimate that
German culture is superior to that of the rest of the world. We
think—or at least the Americans who know the Germans best think,
and say very freely—^that the Germans are particularly strong in
traits which we conspicuously lack, and that Americans would be
a nobler people than they are if we could reinforce American life
with a liberal infusion of German superiorities.
In the second place, it would be a great mistake for Germans to
suppose that Americans are relatively misinformed about the great
outstanding facts in the European situation. On the contrary, it
has been evident from the second day of August that, as compared
with the other nations of the world, the Americans are posted up
to date. I heard Professor Kiihnemannsay this with emphasis to a
large audience of Germans a week ago. He confessed that he was
astonished on arriving here to find out how much more fully
informed the Americans are than any of the Europeans about what
has actually occurred. The main reasbn for this is obvious. Not
being at war we have no censorship, as each of the belligerents
must have. Each of the warring nations gets only such statements
about the war as its own censors think it wise for the public to have.
We get everything that the wires are allowed to take from every
country in Europe, and Amsterdam and Rome send us every day
more or less useful means of checking up the statements of the
combatants. Our newspapers are the greediest in the world for
news. In this upheaval of civilization, the only news that is sure
to be read by everybody is that from the different war zones. The
great rival newspapers are in the keenest competition to be known
as purveyors of the most complete and accurate reports. Every
day we read in them side by side the official statements of each of
the contending nations, together with all the other evidence that
can be collected by their regiments of European correspondents.
The sources of these reports are carefully indicated—whether
official, semi-official, the unsupported statements of such and such
an individual, or mere rumours, the source of which cannot be
traced. Each of the leading papers has a staff of so-called
"military experts," i.e., retired graduates of West Point and
Annapolis, our military and naval academies, who digest the official
reports every day, and interpret the strategic meaning of the
different situations as they develop. Maps drawn by them are
published sometimes as often as every day. These digests and
charts are syndicated to the smaller papers throughout the
country. Of course, we are not informed of precise military details
until they are ancient history, measured by our attentive interest;
but the experience of two months proves that our information has
kept us in the main accurately informed several days, and often
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weeks, ahead of the general public in either of the countries directly
involved.
To what extent this is true about the developments in the several
cotintries among the civilians, we are in a less favourable condition
to judge. The situation is such that we are evidently more in the
dark about the civilians in Germany than in France or England.
We had long since made up our minds, however, that we were
mistaken in our primary theory as to the probable reaction in
Germany. The Americans are extremely rare—I have been unable
to find one in my own range of acquaintances—who believed that
the governments would allow the spark which started the con-
flagration to kindle anything more general than a settlement between
Austria and Servia. It was the well nigh invariable opinion here
that the governments could not permit themselves to be drawn into
the iricredible folly of a general war. When we found that the
unbelievable was actual, we declared that the great body of the
German people certainly could not endorse a war which from our
standpoint is the most damning indictment of European diplomacy
that has ever been drawn. We were early convinced that we were
again mistaken. We now know that the Germans are making one
oi the most wonderful exhibitions of national unity in the history
of the world. We also admire the spirit of this unity while we
believe the course of reasoning upon which it is based is one of the
most deplorable mistakes in history. I will say more about that
in a moment.
In the third place, because of what I have already said you
may be able to see at once that two things are quite probable :
first, that the lies which have been told about Germany have not
had the influence in America which you suppose; secondly, that
you do not sufficiently take into account the efl'ect which lies told
in Germany about the other nations have had upon the minds of
Germans. As to the first, I think it is highly probable that the
Americans are the most incredulous people in the world. " That
which is written " has notorious potenc}^ to palsy the judgment,
and Americans are no exceptions to the rule. On the other hand,
Americans are omnivorous newspaper readers, and one of the few
mitigating circumstances connected with this fact is that it results
in a gratifying case under the law " familiarity breeds contempt."
We have an unlimited capacity to swallow sensational reports, but
we have a corresponding scepticism about their value. In the first
days of consternation that war was possible at all, the only reports
we could get came from Belgian and Erench and English sources,
and were, of course, of the most lurid character. They had the
effect of increasing the general horror and indignation. After
there had been time for second thought, and after we had heard
substantially the same stories about each of the armies, that whole
phase of the situation ]o.st its hold upon our interest. We not only
doubt that one army is more guilty than another of unnecessary
brutality, but we decline to be excited about the by-products of war
so long as the essential barbarity of war itself is unre.strained.
As to the other matter, I may not be able to convince you, but
I state the facts as we see them. The German people will some
time discover that at least one lie has been in circulation in Germany
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about the other peoples of the world for every lie that has been
invented elsewhere about the Germans. As we Americans see it,
one of the antecedents which have made this war possible, and which
have made the Germans regard it as a holy war, is a whole fictitious
psychology of the other peoples. A single illustration on which I
can give testimony will indicate what I mean. Shortly after your
letter reached me I received a paper from Berlin, on the first page
of which, under prominent headlines, was an account of an alleged
disturbance on the Canadian border, with indications that the
United States would presently take possession of Canada ! One
would hardly supp>ose that a Berlin editor could imagine that there
is a single individual in Berlin stupid enough to regard such a
report as worth the ink which it took to print it. There is less
probability that such an idea could be taken seriously on either side
of the Canadian border than that Saxony at this moment should
fear an incursion from Prussia : yet a whole mythology of this sort
has misinterpreted the rest of the world to Germany. I do not
mean to assert that all Germans have been uncritical about these
fables. All that I urg-e is that it would be extremely hazardous for
the Germans to assume that they have clear white light about the
other nations, while the other nations are befogged about the
Germans. It is perfectly evident, for instance, that the Germans
have taken for granted many things that are wide of the facts about
the relations of the British colonies to the mother country, and
that these misconceptions have had not a little weight in calculations
of the probable fortunes of war.
Then I want to testify about the American judgment as to the
antecedents of the war. In a word, we have debated in private
and in public, in newspapers and magazines, on the lecture platform
and in the pulpit, the merits of the cases as presented by the
warring nations each for itself. We shall doubtless make these
claims the texts for much more discussion till long after peace is
concluded. But our first reaction has been ratified by the general
consensus of our accumulating conviction, viz., " a plague o' both
your houses." Our general judgment is that if the controversy
were settled beyond dispute, it would merely save the face of one
chancellory or another as to the matter of skill in diplomatic
manoeuvres. That whole question looks to us unspeakably paltry
in comparison with the underlying fact. The essential thing, as
we see it, is that all Europe is living- on a militaristic basis, and is
sacrificing the interests of the citizens- as human beings to an
arbitrary monster of " military necessity." The report has reached
us within a few days that a delegation of German professors will
be sent to this country after Christmas to lecture on the German
side of the war. They will be welcomed almost everywhere, and
audiences will listen to them and applaud them. But so far as
changing any one's opinion is concerned, they would do (Germany
much more good by staying at home than by bringing to us
amplifications of the type of argument by which German scholars
have thus far tried to support the German programme.
We do not believe the political morality of Germany is either
hig-her or lo-wer than that of England or Erance. We are not vpry
much deceived about the essence of the Belgian incident. We
no THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
know perfectly well that if the objective and subjective conditions
had been turned about, and if England or France or for that matter
the United States had been in the place of Germany in the closing
days of last July, either of the three would in all probability have
done just what Germany did in Belgium. Not being directly
concerned in the complication, however, we can see that in fact it
was an appalling confession of the essential barbarism of a mili-
taristic civilization. To Americans this is not a war of Germans
against Slavs, nor of Germans against England. In its ultimate
causes and effects we believe it will turn out to be a war against
war.
Americans are judging the Germans to-day not on the ground
of anything that anybody else has said about them, but on the basis
of their own declarations about themselves. Nobody knows better
than the Germans that they have nowhere more startlingly exem-
plified their racial superiority of thoroughness than in their
preparedness for war and in their theories about war. The German
literature of militarism from Treitschke—not to go back further—
to Bernhardi has not been hid in a corner. In this country we
have been reading it, particularly for the last dozen years, but we
have regarded it as what Herbert Spencer would call the
" professional bias " of the officers. Very few of us have believed,
even in our most imaginative moments, that the German people
could ever be manoeuvred into a position in which as one man they
would regard it as the only moral alternative to endorse that
militaristic philosophy. In this country all but a feeble minority
regard the militaristic conception as a betrayal of reason and an
appeal to chaos as the ultimate cosmic principle.
Ktihnemann's address that I referred to above filled two hours,
and was the most passionate declamation that I have ever heard.
He announced as his subject " German Militarism." It turned
out to be one of the most curious webs of fallacy that I have ever
met. He never once in the two hours so much as hinted at
" militarism " in the sense which every one in this country attaches
to that term. He assumed throughout that '" militarism " has no
other meaning than the " German people armed for defence of the
Fatherland," and he wasted his breath defending the right of the
Germans to train themselves for military duty. To Americans
that sort of thing proves either stupidity or evasion. We mean
by " militarism " the creed that war is the foremost means of
national self-realisation, and that the " interests of the state "
justify the making of war by a strong'er nation upon a weaker.
Americans do not want any nation of Europe to gain a foot of the
territory of any other nation without the free consent both of the
nation and of the occupants of the possible cession. They do not
believe that there is any difference worth speaking' of between the
European nations in their willingness to make the most of their
military or naval strength in pursuit of the militaristic ideal. They
know what is open to all the world, that Germany has done more
than all the rest of the world put together in the way of elaborating
and publishing this militaristic ideal. They do not want Germany
humbled, but they do want this hideous cult so discredited that no
nation in Europe will profess it after this war is done.
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When I began this reply I had no intention of letting it run to
this length, and what I have said amounts only to the introduction
to what I wanted to say; but I must stop. Let me assure you that
Americans hate the idea of aggressive might so genuinely that they
will have no sympathy with vindictive might, however the war
results. So far as I can judge of our whole people by the indexes
which I can use, we hope the war will result in an absolute stalemate.
We should be delighted if every bit of military and naval equipment
of all the nations were to be wiped out of existence to-morrow,
without the loss of another life, and if the cabinets should then be
forced by the respective peoples to do what was their duty in the
first place— j^oin in a candid and rational adjustment of a modus
Vivendi. Our most influential men are talking seriously of pro-
posing to Europye at the close of the war a system of international
police composed of quotas of troops from all the nations, repre-
senting an international tribunal, and proceeding against any
nation which refuses to abide by the findings of the tribunal.
Possibly we are so far removed from tlie fumes of the battlefield
that this, which Europe would regard as a diseased dream now,
may turn out to be a forward look into the clear air of a better day.
Sincerely,
ALBION W . SMALL.
